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SECURITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECISIONS DURING THE 1984-85 TERM
SUSANNA T. KINTZ* **
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
19342 were enacted by Congress with the intention of providing protec-
tions for securities investors.3 The case law interpreting the Securities
Acts is a large and continuously changing body of law. In its 1984-85
term, the Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases which contribute
significantly to securities law. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit indi-
cate a willingness on the part of the court to provide remedies for injured
investors. On the other hand, the court demonstrated an unwillingness
to extend coverage of the Acts beyond their intended proscriptions. This
article will analyze seven of the more significant cases decided by the
Seventh Circuit during its 1984-85 term and examine the implications of
those decisions.
The decisions examined in this article span a variety of areas. This
article will begin with a discussion of a case in which the Seventh Circuit
was called upon to determine whether a Rule lob-5 plaintiff has a duty to
investigate the misrepresentations of a defendant. Next, the decision of
the Seventh Circuit to refuse to vary the standards for reopening a judg-
ment under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) will be examined to the extent that the
decision implicates the question of whether an implied right of action
exists under Rule lOb-5 in court approved securities transactions. Then,
the Seventh Circuit's acceptance of the sale of business doctrine will be
considered in light of the United States Supreme Court's subsequent re-
jection of the doctrine.
* B.S. in Mathematics and Economics, University of Southern California, 1983; Candidate
for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, January 1987.
.. The author wishes to express her appreciation to Roger Carlson for his contribution to this
article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982). Hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982). Hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act (or collectively with the
1933 Act as the Securities Acts or Acts).
3. See Federal Securities Act, 1933: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presi-
dent of the United States of America), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAN, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY: SECURITIES AcT 1933, Item 20 (1973) (emphasizing the need for disclosure in order to
protect securities investors); see also S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), reprinted in 5
ELLENBERGER & MAHAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE AcT 1934, Item
17 (1973) (discussing the need to regulate excessive speculation and manipulative practices employed
in the securities markets in order to protect investors).
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This article will also discuss a case in which the Seventh Circuit
concluded that an instrument, which qualifies as a note within the mean-
ing of the Securities Acts, does not also have to qualify as an investment
contract in order to constitute a security. Further, the court's stance on
the federal courts' duty to compel arbitration of state securities claims
will be evaluated in light of a recent Supreme Court decision. Lastly, this
article will examine two cases in which the Seventh Circuit reached
outside of the Securities Acts in order to extend the potential liability of
securities and commodities dealers.
RULE lOb-5: PLAINTIFF'S DUTY To INVESTIGATE
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,4 is a
broad antifraud provision designed to prohibit fraudulent and manipula-
tive practices employed in connection with the sale of securities.5 In
drafting Rule lOb-5, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) de-
clined to establish the elements of the lOb-5 offense.6 Consequently, the
courts were left with the responsibility of carving out the elements of
Rule lOb-5. 7 One element, recognized by some courts, was the duty to
investigate.8 These courts imposed a duty on an investor, who was seek-
ing to recover under Rule 1Ob-5 for the defendant's misrepresentations
and omissions of material fact, to investigate the truthfulness of the de-
fendant's representations. Although most courts no longer impose such
a duty on plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 cases, 9 the issue still arises as Teamsters
Local 282 Pension Plan v. Angelos, 10 decided by the Seventh Circuit in its
1984-85 term illustrates.
Consistent with most of the other elements of a private right of ac-
tion under Rule lOb-5, the duty to investigate has its basis in common
law. It The duty stems from the defense of contributory negligence recog-
nized under the law of negligent misrepresentation. 12 The rationale for
4. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act grants the SEC the broad power to impose rules with which
to combat fraudulent practices. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Pursuant to this grant of authority, the
SEC adopted Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1975) (discussing Congress' intent in
enacting § 10(b)).
6. See Wheeler, Plaintifl's Duty of Due Care Under Rule lob-5.: An Implied Defense To An
Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561, 564-66 (1975).
7. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
8. Id.
9. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
10. 762 F.2d 522, 527 (7th Cir. 1985).
11. 3 L. Loss, SECURrriEs REGULATION 1430-32 (2nd ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969) (discussing the
relationship between the common law concepts of fraud and the concepts of fraud embodied in the
Securities Acts); Wheeler, supra note 6, at 568, 575-78.
12. Wheeler, supra note 6, at 568.
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imposing the duty is that a plaintiff should not be able to "successfully
maintain a private lOb-5 action if his own carelessness has contributed to
his loss."' 13 The courts imposed the duty in cases where the defendant's
conduct was merely negligent.' 4  However, in congruence with the
common law, the courts refrained from imposing the duty when the
defendant's conduct was intentional. 15 Thus, after Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,16 in which the Supreme Court held Rule lOb-5 requires sci-
enter, few courts have recognized the duty in Rule lOb-5 cases. 17
Although the duty to investigate is no longer generally accepted as
an element of Rule l0b-5, the issue of whether an investor has a duty to
investigate still arises because courts have intertwined the concept of the
duty with other elements of a Rule lOb-5 action.18 For example, some
courts have analyzed the duty to investigate in terms of reasonable reli-
ance' 9 which is a requisite element under Rule lOb-5. 20 These courts
reasoned that it may be unreasonable for an investor to rely on the repre-
sentations of a defendant without conducting an investigation particu-
larly where the investor has the means to do so. In Angelos, the Seventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the trustees of a pension fund rea-
sonably relied upon the misrepresentations of the defendant where the
trustees had a legal obligation to investigate such misrepresentations
under ERISA but failed to do so. The Seventh Circuit determined that
13. Id.
14. Id. at 577-83.
15. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977); Holds-
worth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 587, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Competi-
tive Assoc., Inc., v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975).
See also Wheeler, supra note 6, at 576-77 (discussing the courts reluctance to impose a duty in cases
where the defendant's conduct was intentional). But cf. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015-20
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977) (holding that, although an investor does have a duty to
investigate even where the defendant's conduct was intentional, the investor's failure to do so will
only preclude his recovery if, under the circumstances, his failure to investigate renders him as
culpable as the defendant).
16. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18. See Wheeler, supra note 6, at 570-75. Some courts did treat the duty as an independent
element. See id. at 574; Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1016. However, other courts linked the duty to the
requirement of reasonable reliance. See Holdsworth, 545 F.2d at 694 (while determining that an
investor does not generally have the duty to investigate under Rule lOb-5, the Holdsworth court left
open the possibility that in some circumstances the investor's duty to investigate may bear on the
issue of whether he reasonably relied); see Wheeler, supra note 6, at 570. Other courts have incorpo-
rated the duty into the defendant's duty to disclose. Wheeler, supra note 6, at 572.
19. See supra note 18.
20. Reasonable reliance is an element of Rule l0b-5. See Haggerty, Fraud on the Market: The
Decline of Reliance In a lOb-5 Action, 12 GOLDEN GATE 407, 411-14 (1982). However, the Supreme
Court has held that positive proof of reliance is not necessary in cases involving omissions of mate-
rial fact. See Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). For the reason
that most misrepresentation cases can be recharacterized as omission eases, doubt has arisen as to
the continued viability of the reliance requirement. See generally Haggerty, supra.
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the trustees obligation under ERISA was irrelevant to the determination
of whether they reasonably relied within the meaning of Rule lOb-5.
In Angelos, the trustees of Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trustfund
(Fund) loaned $200,000 to Des Plaines Bancorporation, Inc. (Bank) in
early 1979. The trustees were not equipped to evaluate the soundness of
the loan and did not obtain outside assistance. The Bank officials materi-
ally misrepresented the financial condition of the bank. In truth, the
Bank was experiencing serious financial troubles and, in March 1981,
state regulatory officials closed the bank.
The Fund first brought suit in New York against the trustees claim-
ing that the trustees violated their duties to the beneficiaries of the
Fund. 21 The New York district court held, and the Second Circuit af-
firmed, that a reasonable investigation would have revealed the "shaky
status" of the Bank, and the trustees' failure to conduct an investigation
constituted a breach of the duty imposed by ERISA.
The Fund subsequently brought suit in the District Court of North-
ern Illinois against the Bank, and the law firm representing the Bank in
making the loan, claiming that they violated Rule lOb-5 and other provi-
sions of the Securities Acts.22 The District Court found that it was
bound by the findings of the New York District Court and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants holding that the trustees' failure to
adequately investigate the Bank before making the loan, thereby breach-
ing their fiduciary duties, precluded them from relying on the defendant's
misrepresentations. The Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Seventh Circuit found that the trustees' duty under ERISA was
irrelevant with respect to whether the trustees had reasonably relied on
the defendants' misrepresentations. 23 The Seventh Circuit premised its
reasoning on the general rule that an ordinary investor is under no duty
21. During the course of the New York litigation, the trustees of the fund filed a third-party
complaint against the bank directors and the law firm which represented the bank in making the
loan (collectively "defendants"). The complaint charged that the defendants had defrauded the
trustees. The New York court dismissed the complaint holding that the arguments should be raised
in independent litigation.
22. The Fund alleged violations of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78K(b); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975); and the Illinois
negligent misrepresentation law.
23. In addition to the issue of whether a lOb-5 plaintiff has a duty to investigate, the Seventh
Circuit addressed several other issues raised in the Angelos case. First, the court upheld the district
court's determination that it was bound by the New York court's findings of fact. See 762 F.2d at
525-26. Second, the court declined to determine whether an implied right of action exists under
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Id. at 530-31. Third, although the court did not decide the Illinois negli-
gent misrepresentation claim, it noted that the duty to investigate under the Illinois law may be
greater than under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 531. And fourth, the Seventh Circuit, in remanding the case,
instructed the district court to first determine whether the loan at issue constituted a security and, if
so, whether the defendants possessed the requisite scienter. Id. at 532.
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to investigate. The court concluded that the duty imposed by ERISA on
trustees of pension plans was designed to compel the trustees to exercise
the same degree of care in investing the assets of the Fund as they would
exercise in investing their own funds. Thus, the trustees' duty to investi-
gate under Rule lOb-5 is no different than that of the ordinary investor.
The court reasoned that the duty imposed under ERISA is merely an-
other legal safeguard designed by Congress to protect the beneficiaries of
pension plans. The failure of the trustees to comply with their duty does
not excuse the defendants from complying with their legal obligation to
tell the truth.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, offered the defendants
two arguments with which to respond to the court's above conclusion,
but went on to determine that neither argument was persuasive. First,
the defendants could analogize to the common law of torts and claim
that the trustees were contributorily negligent. However, Judge Easter-
brook pointed out that contributory negligence is not a defense to an
intentional tort which, after Hochfelder, includes Rule 1Ob-5. Therefore,
the defense was not available under the circumstances. Second, the de-
fendants could analogize to third-party beneficiary contracts and claim
that they were beneficiaries of ERISA. However, because the defendants
were not the intended beneficiaries of ERISA, this argument was simi-
larly unavailing.
Lastly, the court rejected the defendant's contention that, in order
to satisfy the reasonable reliance requirement all investors who purchase
securities in large, privately negotiated transactions must conduct an in-
vestigation. The court found that the argument failed "to give the
seller's obligation to tell the truth the primacy that it must have."' 24 The
court noted that other courts had similarly rejected the contention that a
buyer's failure to exercise due care or diligence is a defense in intentional
fraud cases. Further, the court determined that the policy considerations
do not promote such a rule. The court found that imposition of a duty to
investigate would in turn impose costs on all investors to perform such
an investigation while, at the same time, set the "would-be tortfeasor"
free to commit misrepresentations without fear of liability.25
The Seventh Circuit took care to note that Rule lOb-5 does not im-
pose absolute liability. In order to recover, an investor must establish
that it was reasonable to rely on the defendant's representations. In some
circumstances, the mere fact that a defendant made misrepresentations
24. Id. at 528.
25. Id.
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or omissions of material fact is not enough, in itself, to establish reason-
able reliance. The court specified three circumstances in which reason-
able reliance may not be established. First, if the investor receives a
writing which explicitly discloses the risks but is told orally that there are
no risks, then it is unreasonable for the investor to rely on the misrepre-
sentation because he holds the truth in his hands. Second, if the investor
is aware of the risks, and the defendant's representations do not dispel
them, then the investor's reliance is unreasonable unless "there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the misrepresentation significantly altered the to-
tal mix of the information that the investor possesse[d]. ' '26 And third, if
the misrepresentation or omission concerns matters known to the inves-
tor equally or better than to the defendant, then it is unreasonable for the
investor to rely on the misrepresentations. The court determined that the
situation presented in the Angelos case did not fall into any of these
categories.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Angelos was well reasoned and
proper. Congress enacted ERISA and section 10(b) with the express in-
tention of protecting pension fund beneficiaries and investors in general.
As the court pointed out, it would be plainly contrary to Congress's in-
tent to hold that the failure of one legal safeguard excuses the failure of
the other. However, the duty to investigate will still be important in
Rule lOb-5 cases even though it may not be expressly referred to. In
privately negotiated transactions in particular, the reasonableness of fail-
ing to investigate will always be implicit in the issue of reasonable
reliance.
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER RULE lOb-5 IN COURT-
APPROVED SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
Enforcement of Rule lOb-5 is largely achieved through private civil
actions. Although the Rule does not expressly provide a private right of
action, it is well settled that an implied private right of action exists. 27 In
fact, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that an investor
has an implied right of action under Rule 1Ob-5 for misstatements con-
tained in a registration statement filed in compliance with the 1933 Act,
even where such investor has an express right of action under section 11
of the 1933 Act.28 Given the Supreme Court's undaunted acceptance of
an implied right of action under Rule lOb-5, one would expect that an
26. Id. at 530 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
27. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). The Court stated "The
existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Id.
28. Id.
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implied right of action would be recognized wherever fraud has been
practiced in connection with a securities transaction. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit, in Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark,29 indicated that this may
not be the case with respect to securities transactions which are approved
by a court.
In Metlyn, Esmark, Inc. owned a controlling interest in TransOcean
Oil, Inc. and decided to acquire the rest. Esmark made a tender offer of
$12 per share. The tender offer raised Esmark's ownership of Trans-
Ocean to 87.5%. Four groups of TransOcean shareholders brought four
separate suits alleging that Esmark violated its duty to disclose its inter-
nal valuations showing that TransOcean was worth more than $12 per
share. One group of shareholders reached a settlement.
The settlement provided that Esmark would pay the TransOcean
shareholders, who had previously accepted the tender offer, an additional
$2.80 per share. Additionally, Esmark would exchange 0.9 shares of Es-
mark stock for one share of TransOcean stock with the TransOcean
shareholders who still held their shares. The settlement agreement was
conditioned upon judicial determination that the terms were fair. After a
hearing, the District Court found that the terms were fair and subse-
quently TransOcean merged with Esmark.
Less than one year later, Esmark sold TransOcean to Mobil for $60
per share. The shareholders, who were parties to the settlement agree-
ment, sought to reopen the judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on the
grounds that Esmark had withheld from the court its plans to resell
TransOcean, and that Esmark's expert witness lied regarding certain ma-
terial facts upon which his opinion as to the value of the stock was based.
The District Court denied the motion.
The standards for reopening a judgment under Rule 60(b) are strin-
gent. Rule 60(b) allows a court to reopen a case for fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or other misconduct of a party. 30 A movant under 60(b) must
establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 31 Further, unless the
movant can prove that the adverse party procurred or knew of the false
testimony, the motion must be denied unless the fraud created a substan-
tial danger of an unjust result. 32 Moreover, the decision of a district
29. 763 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1985).
30. Other grounds for reopening a final judgment under Rule 60(b) are: mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b); judgment is void, judgment
has been satisfied, released, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment.
31. 763 F.2d at 832.
32. Id. (quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1984)).
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court declining to reopen judgment under Rule 60(b) may be reviewed
only for abuse of discretion. Such a decision is attributed the greatest
deference where that court is the same court in which the alleged fraud
occurred.
33
At the hearing, it had been established that neither Esmark nor its
counsel knew that their witness's statements were false. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the witness's lies did not create substantial danger
of an unjust result because there was other evidence upon which the the
district court could have based its conclusion that the terms were fair. In
particular, the Seventh Circuit attributed great weight to the market
price at the time of the original hearing. Accordingly, the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court properly denied the motion to reo-
pen judgment.
The shareholders contended that the standards under Rule 60(b)
should be relaxed in securities cases because the standards for deducing
fraud under Rule lOb-5 are less stringent. The Seventh Circuit noted
that the case did not involve an implied right of action under Rule lOb-5,
nonetheless, the court found that many of the same principles for deduc-
ing the existence of an implied right of action applied.
34
In applying those principles, the court found that it was "quite far-
fetched to suppose that Congress meant to change the rules of civil litiga-
tion when it enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and authorized the SEC
to promulgate Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act."'35 Further, the court
found that relaxing the standards under Rule 60(b) would interfere with
the principles, developed under the Rule, which are "tuned to the bene-
fits and burdens of reopening judgments.",36 For these reasons, the court
refused to vary the standards under Rule 60(b). The court stated that
these standards constituted the "sole means of attack on final civil
judgments. '
37
It is plain that the Seventh Circuit's application of Rule 60(b) in
33. Id. at 831. The district court which refused to reopen the judgment was the same court
which had determined that the terms of the settlement agreement were fair in the original hearing.
In refusing to reopen judgment, the district court determined that the expert witness' misstatements
had been adequately challenged at the hearing and found no evidence of fraud or deliberate decit.
Further, it determined that the witness' misstatements had not affected its determination. The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that these factors made the movants' task more difficult than the general
requirement of establishing that the district court abused its discretion. Additionally, the Seventh
Circuit noted that "deference is never greater than when the underlying judgment is a settlement."
Id.





Metlyn was proper. However, the court's analogy to the existence of an
implied right of action under Rule lOb-5 is troubling. The court's deci-
sion implies that no implied private right of action under Rule 1Ob-5
exists for fraud practiced in connection with a court-approved securities
transaction. 38 This implication is troubling because it necessarily re-
stricts the protection afforded to the parties of such a transaction under
the Securities Acts. For example, the standards for reopening a case
under Rule 60(b) are significantly stricter than the standards for estab-
lishing a violation of Rule lOb-5. In particular, the standard of proof
required under Rule 60(b) is clear and convincing evidence 39 whereas the
Supreme Court has specifically rejected such a stringent standard under
lOb-5 and requires only a preponderance of the evidence. 40 Thus, inves-
tors injured in a court-approved securities transaction would bear a
higher burden of proof in order to recover if an implied right of action is
recognized. Consequently, the Securities Acts would afford such inves-
tors less protection than the investor in an ordinary securities
transaction.
The issue of whether an implied right of action under Rule lOb-5
exists in this context was not directly raised in Metlyn, and therefore, the
case may have little bearing on the ultimate determination of the issue.
However, the Metlyn court introduced a new wrinkle to the implied right
of action analysis-the existence of a conflict between the principles un-
derlying Rule 60(b) and Rule lOb-5. Consequently, when the Seventh
Circuit does address the implied right of action issue, it may very well
have to consider the Metlyn concerns.
Another important aspect of the court's decision in Metlyn is the
court's determination that the price of TransOcean stock at the time of
the hearing was entitled to great weight by the district court in determin-
ing whether the terms of the settlement agreement were fair. The district
court had determined that, due to the proposed merger, the market price
was unreliable. However, the Seventh Circuit found that "[the price] re-
flected not only the value of a merger but also the value investors would
have had in the absence of a merger, which was not a certainty," and
thus was some evidence of the true value of the stock.41 Metlyn indicates
38. Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts distributions of securities which are
approved by a court or in certain administrative proceedings from the registration provisions of the
Act. It does not exempt such distributions from the antifraud provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10)
(1982).
39. 763 F.2d at 832 (quoting Ervin v. Wilkinson, 701 F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1983)).
40. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387-91.
41. 763 F.2d at 835.
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that the Seventh Circuit will attribute significant weight to market value
in determining the value of securities in the future.
THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
The registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts are
not applicable to instruments which are not securities. Thus, the starting
point of any securities case is the determination of whether the particular
instrument constitutes a security within the meaning of the Securities
Acts. Section 2 of the 1933 Act 42 and section 3 of the 1934 Act 43 provide
the definition of a security. These provisions designate specific instru-
ments as securities, including stock, notes, investment contracts and
others. Christison v. Groen,44 decided by the Seventh Circuit in its 1984-
85 term, raised the issue of whether the controlling interest of stock of a
corporation constitutes a security within the meaning of the Securities
Acts.
Until recently, the United States Courts of Appeals have been in
dispute as to whether a transaction involving the sale of 100% of the
stock of a corporation constituted a sale of securities within the meaning
of the Securities Acts.45 Many circuits had adopted what is known as the
sale of business doctrine, which provides that the sale of 100% of the
stock of a corporation is not a sale of securities.46 In Christison v. Groen,
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its acceptance of the doctrine. However,
subsequent to the Seventh Circuit's decision of Christison, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the sale of business doctrine in Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth,47 and held that the sale of the controlling inter-
est of stock of a corporation is a sale of securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts. It is readily apparent that the Landreth case will
have a significant impact on the application of the Securities Acts. An
examination of the Landreth decision and the rationale underlying the
now extinct sale of business doctrine applied by the Seventh Circuit in
Christison may provide insight into the Seventh Circuit's analysis of
other securities in other contexts.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
44. 740 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1984).
45. The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits recognize the sale of business doctrine.
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits reject the doctrine. See generally Krauja,
Substance Over Form: The Ninth Circuit Endorses the Sale of Business Doctrine, 26 ARIz. L. REV.
975, 975-76 (1984).
46. See generally Carson, Application of the Federal Securities Acts to the Sale of a Closely Held
Corporation by Stock Transfer, 36 ME. L. REV. 1, 14-23 (1984) (discussing the emergence of the sale
of business doctrine).
47. 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
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The sale of business doctrine, as accepted by the Seventh Circuit,
stems from the court's interpretation of SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.,48 and
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.49 In Howey, the Supreme
Court held that a partition of an orange grove coupled with a contract
for the cultivation of the grove was an investment contract, and therefore
a security. In so holding, the Court devised a test: a "contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enter-
prise and is led to expect profits from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party" is an investment contract within the meaning of the Securi-
ties Acts.50
In Forman, the Court was confronted with a situation in which the
plaintiffs held instruments which were labeled "stock" but which merely
entitled the plaintiffs to lease residential space in an apartment complex.
The Supreme Court first determined that the instrument did not possess
any of the characteristics of traditional stock.51 The Court then went on
to determine whether the instrument satisfied the Howey test. In finding
that the Howey test was not met, and that therefore the instrument was
not a security, the Court stated that the Howey test "embodies all the
essential attributes that run through all the Court's decisions defining a
security."'5
2
In cases involving the sale of a controlling interest of stock of a cor-
poration, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Howey and Forman as provid-
ing a general rule that an interest is not a security unless it satisfies the
Howey test.5 3 Accordingly, the court concluded that the sale of 100% of
the stock of a corporation is not a security because the purchaser can
exert control and if the purchaser intends to do so, then that purchaser is
not investing with the expectation that profits will be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. Thus, the sale of business
doctrine emerged.
In 1981, the Seventh Circuit, in Frederickson v. Poloway,5 4 expanded
the scope of the sale of business doctrine by finding that the sale of less
than 100% of the stock of a business does not involve a securities trans-
action if it is a commercial as opposed to an investment venture. The
48. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
49. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
50. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
51. 421 U.S. at 851.
52. Id. at 852.
53. Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976). The court stated: "reliance
on the efforts of others to produce a profit is the most important aspect of an investment, which, in
turn, is an essential characteristic of transactions intended to be protected by the federal securities
laws." Id. at 41.
54. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
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Seventh Circuit determined that a transaction is a commercial venture if
the purchaser can and intends to exert control over the purchased busi-
ness. In 1982, in Sutter v. Groen,55 the Seventh Circuit further expanded
the doctrine by creating a presumption of the purchaser's intent to con-
trol where the purchase involves more than 50% of the company's stock.
In Christison, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its acceptance of the doc-
trine and the presumption of commerciality.
In Christison, Sutter owned 70% of Happy Radio Company. Prior
to Sutter's purchase of the Happy Radio stock, Happy Radio entered
into an agreement to purchase 100% of Bret Broadcasting Company
over a twelve year period. Christison, the trustee of the bankrupt estate
of Sutter, alleged that the defendants, the Groens, who sold Bret Broad-
casting to Happy Radio, misrepresented Bret's earnings in violation of
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts. The issue before the Sev-
enth Circuit was whether Sutter's purchase of 70% of Happy Radio con-
stituted a securities transaction within the meaning of the Securities
Acts. The Seventh Circuit applied the sale of business doctrine and the
presumption of commerciality and held that it did not.
The Landreth case presented essentially the same issue-whether
the sale of 100% of the stock of a corporation constituted the sale of
securities within the meaning of the Securities Acts. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's application of the sale of business doctrine
and determined that the sale was not a securities transaction. 56 The
Supreme Court reversed and in so doing, expressly rejected the sale of
business doctrine.5 7 Consequently, the Landreth decision effectively
overruled Christison.
The Landreth Court held that stock is a category of security specifi-
cally listed in the Securities Acts which is provable by its characteristics.
The characteristics of stock include the right to receive dividends contin-
gent upon an apportionment of profits, negotiability, pledgability, voting
rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, and potential for
appreciation.58 The Court concluded that the stock in question pos-
sessed all these characteristics and therefore was a security within the
meaning of the Securities Acts.
The Court disagreed with the contention that the Howey test must
55. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (This was the first appeal of Christison v. Groen, 740 F.2d 593
(7th Cir. 1984). Sutter went into bankruptcy sometime after the first appeal. Christison was ap-
pointed trustee of Sutter's bankrupt estate).
56. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. 105 S. Ct. at 2304.
58. Id. at 2302.
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be satisfied in order for any instrument to constitute a security. The
Court pointed out that the Securities Acts designate various instruments
as securities, including stocks, notes, investment contracts and others.
The Howey test is applied in order to determine whether a particular
interest is an investment contract and applies only in cases involving un-
usual instruments. 59 Consequently, where the interest involved is tradi-
tional stock, there is no need to determine whether it is also an
investment contract. 6°
The Court cautioned that its holding-treating stock as a specific
category of security provable by its characteristics-could not automati-
cally be extended to other categories of securities specifically listed in the
Acts. In particular, the Supreme Court indicated that its test could not
be applied to notes.61 The court determined that stock is readily distin-
guishable from notes, as well as other categories of securities, in that
there is a high expectation among purchasers of stock that they will be
protected by the Securities Acts. Further, stock is relatively easy to iden-
tify because it lends itself to a consistent definition. 62 The Court also
pointed out that a "note" is a "relatively broad term that encompasses
instruments with widely varying characteristics. '63
The Court noted that there are strong policy reasons for rejecting
the sale of business doctrine. First, even in cases involving the transfer of
100% of the stock of a corporation, a purchaser may not intend to exert
control but rather act as a passive investor. Some commentators believe
that such an investor is entitled to the protections of the Securities Acts.
Second, and more importantly, in cases in which the transfer is of less
than 100% of the stock of the corporation, the application of the doc-
trine depends upon the determination that the purchaser actually ob-
tained control. Under the doctrine, parties could not know whether they
are covered by the Securities Acts until after extended discovery and
litigation.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds,
Inc. 64 demonstrates that the court continues to view the commercial na-
ture of an instrument essential to the determination of whether the in-
strument constitutes a security. However, the Landreth case calls into
59. Id. at 2304.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2306. The defendants in Byrd appeared to have emphasized the general concern that
the Securities Acts should not be read so expansively so as to encompass ordinary commercial bank
loans and other similar instruments.
62. Id. at 2306.
63. Id.
64. 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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question the continued viability of this view particularly if other catego-
ries of securities designated in the Acts are found to be provable by their
characteristics. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's test in Lan-
dreth will be extended to other categories of securities listed in the Secur-
ities Acts. However, the Supreme Court indicated that some of the
factors which will be important in determining whether the test will be
extended to a particular security are: the extent to which the security is
easy to identify; whether the interest is such that a reasonable investor
would expect to be protected; and whether the application of the test
would unnecessarily expand the application of the Securities Acts. It will
be interesting to see whether, in the future, the courts will find that other
securities are provable by their characteristics.
FIXED INTEREST BEARING NOTES AS SECURITIES
In Hussinger v. Rockford Business Credits,65 the Seventh Circuit
again addressed the issue of what constitutes a security within the mean-
ing of the Securities Acts. In particular, Hussinger involved the defini-
tion of a note. Two aspects of the court's decision in Hussinger are
significant. First, the Seventh Circuit determined that a note does not
have to satisfy the Howey test in order to constitute a security. And sec-
ond, the court found that under its interpretation of the Supreme Court's
analysis of the Howey test, instruments bearing fixed rates of return do
not satisfy the "profits" element of Howey.
In Hussinger, Rockford Business Credits, Inc. (RBC), solicited 39
members of the general public and through the sale of instruments la-
belled "notes", raised $2,000,000 for its general business needs. Hus-
singer, a trustee of an employee profit sharing trust, purchased a $30,000
note from RBC for the trust. The note bore an interest rate of one per-
cent above the prime rate and was to mature in one year. Prior to the
stated maturity date, Hussinger tendered the note for redemption. RBC
dishonored the note and Hussinger brought suit alleging various viola-
tions of the Securities Acts.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
note did not constitute a security within the meaning of the Securities
Acts. The district court looked primarily to the fact that the instrument
bore a fixed rate of interest and the note's term to maturity was less than
one year. The court determined that since the rate of return that Hus-
singer was entitled to receive did not depend upon the success or failure
of the enterprise, the instrument was not a security.
65. 745 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1984).
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The Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in relying on
these factors in determining whether the note was a security and re-
versed. The court found that the relevant test is the commercial/invest-
ment test.66 Under the commercial/investment test, a note constitutes a
security if it is an investment as opposed to a commercial transaction.
67
In determining whether the note is an investment, the surrounding fac-
tual circumstances must be considered. 68 However, those factors which
are equally characteristic of investments and commercial enterprises are
not useful to the determination. The court found that the presence of a
fixed rate of interest and a short term to maturity were not useful factors
because they are "neutral among alternatives. ' 69 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit held that the district court erred in relying on these factors. In
remanding the case, the Seventh Circuit instructed the district court to
consider the manner of solicitation, the persons solicited, the magnitude
of the distribution, and other factors relating to the commercial nature of
the transaction.
70
Although the Seventh Circuit, by determining that the district court
incorrectly applied the commercial/investment test, resolved the issue on
appeal, the court went on to discuss RBC's other contentions. RBC con-
tended that the district court properly dismissed Hussinger's complaint
because the note at issue did not constitute an investment contract under
Howey. In particular, RBC contended that fixed interest payments can-
not satisfy the profits element of the Howey test.
The Seventh Circuit first rejected RBC's contention that the note
must satisfy the Howey investment contract test in, order to constitute a
security within the meaning of the Securities Acts. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that, because notes are specifically designated as securities
within the Acts, an instrument which qualifies as a note under the com-
mercial/investment test, does not also have to qualify as an investment
contract under the Howey test. The court noted that in Forman, the
Supreme Court first determined whether the instrument at issue, which
was labeled stock, possessed the characteristics of traditional stock. Only
after the Court determined that the instrument was not stock, did the
Court apply the Howey test.71 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
Forman Court implied that an instrument that does not satisfy the in-
66. Id. at 487-88.
67. Id. at 488.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 492-93.
71. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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vestment contract test may still be a security if it falls under one of the
other specific statutory terms.
The Seventh Circuit then addressed RBC's contention that fixed in-
terest payments cannot satisfy the profits element of the Howey test. As
discussed earlier, the Howey test is the test generally employed in order
to determine whether an instrument constitutes a security.72 In particu-
lar, Howey requires an expectation of profits to be derived from the ef-
forts of others.73 In Forman, the Supreme Court defined profits as
appreciation or a proportionate share in earnings. 74 Various Supreme
Court and Seventh Circuit decisions strongly indicated that fixed returns
do not satisfy the Forman definition. 75 For example, in Marine Bank v.
Weaver,76 the Supreme Court, in finding that the certificate of deposit at
issue was not a security, emphasized the fact that the instrument paid a
fixed rate of return not based upon the profitability of the enterprise.
Additionally, in American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel
Credit Corp. ,77 the Seventh Circuit found that the loan participation
agreement at issue did not lead to an expectation of profits because it
entitled the holder to a "fixed return independent of the underlying pro-
ject." In view of its examination of the law, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the instruments bearing fixed rates of return do not satisfy
the profits requirement of Howey.
Although the Seventh Circuit determined that fixed returns do not
satisfy the profits requirement of Howey, the court went on to question
the wisdom of excluding fixed interest payments from the definition of
profits. The court pointed out that it apparently was Congress' intent, in
including the broad concept of an investment contract in the definition of
a security, to "prevent imaginative promoters from avoiding regulation
by inventing nonconventional instruments. '78 The court warned that, by
giving the term "profits" an inflexible definition, courts may be frustrat-
ing Congress' goals. The court stated that in the future it may reconsider
its interpretation of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Howey test.
72. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
74. 421 U.S. at 852.
75. 745 F.2d at 490.
76. 455 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1982).
77. 635 F.2d 1247, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
78. 745 F.2d at 491.
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ARBITRATION OF FEDERAL, STATE AND COMMON
LAW SECURITIES CLAIMS
Many brokerage companies include broadly worded arbitration
clauses in contracts governing their individual investment accounts.
These arbitration clauses traditionally provide that any dispute arising
out of the contract must be settled by arbitration. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act,79 federal courts are required to enforce arbitration
agreements unless they are otherwise invalid in law or equity. However,
courts have created exceptions to their duty to compel arbitration under
the Act in certain situations involving protective federal legislation.80 In
particular, various circuits have found that, with respect to claims arising
out of contracts governing investment trading accounts, federal courts
are not required to compel arbitration of state law claims where such
claims are inextricably linked with federal securities claims. 81 Other cir-
cuits have found that courts may stay arbitration of state law claims until
after judicial resolution of the federal claims.8 2 During its 1984-85 term,
the Seventh Circuit decided Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc.,83 in
which it reaffirmed its acceptance of this latter view. Soon thereafter,
however, the Supreme Court decided Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd,84 and held that federal courts must compel arbitration of any arbi-
trable claims and may not stay such arbitration until after judicial resolu-
tion of any nonarbitrable claims. After Byrd, two questions remain open;
79. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1982).
80. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (arbitration agreements are void with respect to
claims arising under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (claims arising under the antitrust laws are
inappropriate claims for arbitration); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977) (claims under the Bankruptcy Act and the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are inappropriate claims for arbitration); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Tech-
nical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (claims arising
under the patent laws are inappropriate for arbitration); Breyer v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 548
F. Supp. 955, 961 (D.N.J. 1982) (arbitration is unsuitable for claims under the Commodity Ex-
change Act except under the narrow circumstances delineated in 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l 1)).
81. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that, where the state law claims are inextricably
intertwined, the federal court may in its discretion deny arbitration as to the state claims and try all
the claims together. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir.
1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Cunningham v.
Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
82. The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have found that the Federal Arbitration Act divests
them of any discretion in compelling arbitration of the state claims but may stay arbitration until
after the judicial resolution of the federal securities claim. Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983)
Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984).
84. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
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whether federal securities claims are arbitrable and if so, whether once
arbitrated, are subject to collateral estoppel effect.
In 1977, the Piersons opened a nondiscretionary margin trading ac-
count with Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc. (Dean Witter). The Piersons
signed a contract which provided, in part, for the arbitration of any con-
troversy arising out of or related to the contract. Subsequently, the Pier-
sons brought suit in federal court alleging Dean Witter violated Rule
lOb-5 and committed various common law offenses including breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence and fraud. Dean Witter
moved to dismiss the common law claims or, in the alternative, to stay
those claims for arbitration. The district court denied the motion. The
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court was required to
compel arbitration of the state law claims but may stay such arbitration
until after judicial resolution of the federal claims.
85
As the Pierson case was developing, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit confronted essentially the same issue in Byrd. The district
court refused to compel arbitration of the state law claims and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court held that federal courts are required to compel arbi-
tration of arbitrable claims and, further, may not stay arbitration of those
claims until after judicial resolution of non-arbitrable claims. Thus, Byrd
effectively overruled the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pierson. In decid-
ing Pierson, the Seventh Circuit had assumed, without inquiry, that the
plaintiff's federal securities claim was not subject to arbitration.8 7 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Byrd pointed out that it has never held that
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under Rule lOb-5 are void.88
Although the Supreme Court refused to decide the issue, Justice White,
in his concurring opinion, indicated that such claims may be subject to
arbitration.
Justice White acknowledged that the Supreme Court held, in Wilko
v. Swan,8 9 that agreements to arbitrate under section 12(2) of the 1933
Act are not enforcible. However, Justice White found that the provisions
of the 1933 Act relied upon by the Court in Wilko were significantly
distinguished from the analogous provisions contained in the 1934 Act. 90
85. 742 F.2d at 340.
86. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. 742 F.2d at 338 (the court stated "the Rule 10b-5 claim is concededly not arbitrable").
88. 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.1.
89. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
90. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244-45. Justice White pointed out that the Wilko Court, in holding
that claims arising under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 were non-arbitrable, reasoned that
§ 14 of the 1933 Act provides that any "stipulation" waiving compliance with any "provision" of the
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Therefore, Justice White cautioned, the Wilko doctrine may not be auto-
matically transplanted to claims arising under the 1934 Act. Justice
White emphasized that the issue was still an open one.91
In Byrd, the plaintiffs advanced two justifications to the Court sup-
porting the Ninth Circuit's refusal to compel arbitration of the pendent
state claims. First, they argued that arbitration of the state law claims
would frustrate one of the two goals of the Arbitration Act-to en-
courage efficient and speedy dispute resolution-because it would result
in bifurcated proceedings. The Supreme Court responded that the other
goal of the Arbitration Act-enforcement of private agreements to arbi-
trate-was preeminent and therefore the conflict between the goals must
be resolved in favor of the latter.
Secondly, the plaintiffs argued that arbitration of the state law
claims would threaten the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over fed-
eral securities issues because the arbitration proceeding could have col-
lateral estoppel effect as to the subsequent judicial proceeding involving
resolution of the federal securities claim. The Court concluded that it
was far from certain that arbitration proceedings have preclusive effect as
to "non-arbitrable federal claims," and indicated that they may not have
such effect.92  The Court found that in framing preclusive rules in this
context, the courts will be required to take into account the federal inter-
ests warranting protection. 93 Thus, the Court found that the federal in-
terests at stake are adequately protected without joining proceedings or
staying arbitration in contravention of the purposes of the the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Thus, after Byrd, it remains to be resolved whether federal securities
claims are arbitrable and, if so, to what extent they may be "retried" in a
Securities Act is void. Section 12(2) of the Act expressly creates a private right of action which is
enforceable in any court. The Wilko Court determined that this right to select the forum in which to
litigate a § 12(2) claim constituted a "provision" of the Act, and as such, could not be waived.
Although § 29 of the 1934 Act is equivalent to § 14 of the 1933 Act, Justice White did not
believe that the reasoning of Wilko could be "mechanically transplanted" to claims arising under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Jurisdiction under the 1934 Act is narrower than jurisdiction under the
1933 Act, being restricted to federal courts. Moreover, unlike § 12(2), there is no express private
right of action under § 10(b). Thus, the conclusion that the right to select the forum in which to
litigate a Rule 10b-5 claim constitutes a "provision" of the 1934 Act which cannot be waived is
weaker than for § 12(2). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
91. Prior to Byrd many lower courts held that claims arising under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
were not arbitrable. See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1240 n.1.
92. Id. at 1238. The Court noted that in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1984), it held that unappealed arbitration awards do not have collateral estoppel effect as to § 1983
actions. The Court found that arbitration proceedings were not adequate substitutes for judicial
proceedings with respect to protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 was
designed to protect.
93. 105 S. Ct. at 1244.
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federal court.94 In interpreting Byrd, some courts have held that claims
arising under the 1934 Act are arbitrable. 95 However, it does not appear
that the issue of whether such arbitrable claims are subject to collateral
estoppel effect has been litigated as of yet. With respect to this latter
issue, it may be important to note that giving collateral estoppel effect to
such arbitrable claims may controvert Congress' intent in enacting the
Securities Acts. In drafting the Securities Acts, Congress was aware of
the fact that corporations as well as securities professionals stand on a
different footing than the ordinary investor in their respective abilities to
accurately evaluate a particular security.96 One of Congress' purposes
was to equalize their respective positions. If courts conclude that claims
arising under Rule lOb-5 are arbitrable, and once arbitrated are subject
to collateral estoppel effect, then the investor will waive the extra protec-
tions the Securities Acts were designed to give him merely by signing a
contract containing an arbitration clause.
BROKERS' LIABILITY UNDER THE ILLINOIS LAW OF
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Many investors rely upon the advice of their brokers in making in-
vestment decisions. Often, brokers, not knowing their clients' financial
situations or investment goals, advise clients to purchase stock which is
inappropriate for them. For instance, the broker may recommend stock
which is overly speculative given the client's ability to absorb the poten-
tial loss. Many investors have lost fortunes because they were given poor
investment advice by their brokers. The problem may arise from, or at
least is exacerbated by the fact that the broker, who provides investment
advice, has an inherent conflict of interest because he receives his com-
mission on the sales that he makes as opposed to the profit he makes for
his client.
Various federal rules and statutes have been promulgated in order to
94. The Court's strong stance on arbitration in Byrd may indicate that it will not accept the
circuit courts' holdings as to the enforceability of arbitration agreements in other contexts. See cases
cited supra note 80. For example, the permeation doctrine, which is applied by the Seventh Circuit
in antitrust suits, could come under attack The "permeation doctrine" provides that if the antitrust
issues permeate the entire case, then the district court should proceed with the antitrust issues before
submitting the arbitrable claims to the arbitrator. See Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978).
95. See Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1985). See also Morgan, Olmstead, Ken-
nedy & Gardner v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 608 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that claims
arising under § 10(b) between members of the New York Stock Exchange were arbitrable). But see
Rojas Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(finding that it was bound by prior decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the court held that
the federal claims were not arbitrable).
96. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (1953).
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regulate brokers' conduct in rendering investment advice.97 In particu-
lar, the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York
and American Stock Exchanges have enacted rules (denoted "suitability
rules") which require registered securities broker-dealers to recommend
only those investments which are suitable to the investor's financial situa-
tion and investment goals.98 The broker-dealer is required to conduct a
reasonable inquiry to determine the investor's financial situation and in-
vestment goals.
Although these rules may be effective in improving the quality of
investment advice given by brokers in general, until recently, they were
of little significance to the injured investor. The rules do not expressly
provide a private right of action for the injured investor and it is unlikely
that a court would find that an implied right of action exists. 99 More-
over, even if the rules could be utilized as a standard for finding fraud
under Rule lOb-5, in order to recover, a plaintiff must establish that the
broker-dealer intentionally or recklessly recommended unsuitable invest-
ments. 100 Thus, these rules may provide little solace for the investor who
loses his fortune due to the negligent conduct of his broker. However,
the Seventh Circuit in Zurad v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.,101
gave more significance to these rules by holding that an injured investor
can recover against a broker who negligently fails to conform with a
standard of conduct similar to that imposed by the suitability rules under
a theory of negligent misrepresentation.
Zurad was a fifty-four year old postal worker. In 1978, she opened a
non-discretionary trading account with Lehman Brothers. Curry, who
worked for Lehman, became her broker. Prior to opening the account
with Lehman, Zurad had gained some experience in the stock market.
97. See Salmanowitz, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1081-89 (1977) (discussing the
various laws regulating broker recommendations).
98. See, e.g., NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2152; 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2405. Sections 15A
and 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require the NASD and the exchanges to prescribe
these rules. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78f(b)(5) (1982). See Baker and Lawrence, Actions Against Broker-
Dealers For the Sale of Unsuitable Securities, 13 STETSON L. REV. 283, 283-287 (1984) (discussing
these rules, the duties they impose and the proscriptions of the Securities Acts).
99. Although in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969), the Seventh Circuit held that there was an implied right of action
under the suitability rules, after the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) and
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), it is doubtful that the Seventh Circuit would
find that such a cause of action exists today. See Baker & Lawrence, supra note 97, at 287-302
(explaining why it is unlikely that a court would find that an implied right of action under the
suitability rules exists today).
100. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See generally Baker & Lawrence, supra
note 98.
101. 757 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1985).
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She had invested in a mutual fund, traded in options and traded on mar-
gin. She had not always followed the advice of her brokers and had sus-
tained losses of $15,000. Additionally, she was able to read stock
quotations in the newspaper but did not normally read the financial sec-
tion. Zurad told Curry that she had approximately $100,000 to invest,
and that her investment goals included income production, financial
growth and recoupment of losses.
During the period of time in which Curry acted as Zurad's broker,
news of a potential acquisition of Heller Co. by Midland Bank, Ltd., of
London was widely publicized. Consequently, the price of Heller stock
rose dramatically and trading was suspended on two occasions. Curry
recommended to Zurad that she purchase 2000 shares of Heller stock.
Zurad was unaware of the news stories, the recent increase in price or of
the suspension of trading, and Curry did not inform her of them. Zurad
purchased 5000 shares on margin. The merger fell through and the stock
price plummeted.
Zurad brought suit against Curry and Lehman to recover her losses
which exceeded $75,000. She claimed that Curry violated the suitability
rules. Additionally, she alleged that Curry misrepresented that he had
inside information concerning the merger, in violation of lOb-5, and that
Curry's failure to tell her of the recent increase in the price of Heller
stock or of the suspension of trading constituted violations of lOb-5 and
the Illinois law of negligent misrepresentation.
The district court found for the defendants on all four charges. Ini-
tially, the court determined that there was no implied right of action
under the suitability rules. This issue was not brought before the Seventh
Circuit on appeal. With respect to Zurad's claim that Curry misrepre-
sented that he had inside information, the district court did not resolve
whether such misrepresentation in fact occurred. Instead, the district
court determined that Zurad could not have reasonably relied upon such
misrepresentation because news of the merger had been widely publi-
cized. Additionally, the district court held that Zurad, as a recipient of
material nonpublic information, could not recover under this claim be-
cause she was in pari delicto.
Further, with respect to Curry's failure to inform Zurad of the re-
cent surge in the price of Heller stock or suspension of trading, the dis-
trict court found that Zurad had not established scienter and therefore
found no violation of Rule lOb-5. And lastly, the district court found
that Curry had not negligently misrepresented the degree of speculation
involved in the purchase of Heller stock because he had advised Zurad
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against investing all her assets and indicated that there was a possibility
that the merger might not necessarily occur.
The Seventh Circuit did not resolve Zurad's claim that Curry mis-
represented that he had inside information in violation of Rule lOb-5.
However, the court discussed the district court's determination that
Zurad could not have reasonably relied upon such representation. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court was clearly erroneous in
finding that Zurad knew or should have known of the news stories. The
court emphasized Zurad's limited experience in the securities markets,
her employment as a mail sorter, her infrequent reading of the newspa-
per's financial section and the timing of the publications which preceded
Curry's recommendation of Heller stock. The Seventh Circuit did not
decide the in pari delicto defense, however, the Supreme Court has subse-
quently held that the defense of in pari delicto is not available to a
tipper. 102
The Seventh Circuit then upheld the district court's finding that
Curry's failure to tell Zurad of the recent price surge of Heller stock and
the suspension of trading did not violate Rule lOb-5 in that Zurad had
not established scienter. However, the Seventh Circuit found that Curry
negligently misrepresented the degree of speculation involved in the
purchase of Heller stock and thus was liable to Zurad under Illinois
law. 1
0 3
The essential elements of negligent misrepresentation are a duty
owed, a breach of that duty and injury proximately resulting there-
from. 04 The Seventh Circuit determined that Curry, in rendering invest-
ment advice to Zurad, had a duty to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating information intended to
guide her in her investment decisions. The court concluded that the in-
formation regarding the recent surge in price and the suspension of trad-
ing was highly significant with respect to the degree of speculation
involved, and therefore, the omission of this information amounted to
negligent misrepresentation.
Interestingly, in finding that Curry violated Illinois negligent mis-
representation law, the court effectively imposed a duty upon Curry, and
all brokers who provide investment advice, to disclose those factors
102. Eichler v. Berner, 125 S. Ct. 2622, 2631 (1985).
103. See Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 111. App. 3d 257, 389 N.E.2d 623 (1979) (the
Illinois court held that a real estate agent was liable to her client for negligently misrepresenting the
condition of the sale property).
104. 757 F.2d at 134. The court based this duty on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 552 (1965), which was cited with approval in Citizens Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill. App.
2d 315, 325, 214 N.E.2d 612, 617 (1966).
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which make a particular investment "unsuitable" for that investor.
Although the Seventh Circuit did not expressly refer to the suitability
rules, the court emphasized the factors which made the investment un-
suitable to Zurad. These factors include the probability that the price of
Heller stock would fall to its pre-merger publicity levels if the merger did
not go through, the extent of Zurad's savings that Curry recommended
she invest, the extent of her savings she in fact decided to invest and
Zurad's lack of familiarity with the stock market.
By imposing a duty on brokers to disclose the factors which make
an investment unsuitable, the Seventh Circuit effectively imposed a duty
on brokers to conduct an investigation to determine the financial situa-
tions and investment goals of their customers. These are essentially the
same duties imposed by the suitability rules. Thus, after Zurad, a broker
may be liable for his clients' losses where such broker has negligently
failed to conform with the suitability rules in rendering investment ad-
vice. The Seventh Circuit's holding in Zurad is consistent with a line of
cases which have held either that a violation of the suitability rules is per
se negligence, or that the rules provide a standard for negligence. 0 5
THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE AND THE COMMODITIES
FUTURES TRADER
The mail fraud statute 10 6 has become a device with which the gov-
ernment stamps out generic fraud.10 7 Not only is it utilized to deal with
newly conceived forms of fraud for which there is no "brand name" leg-
islation, it is utilized where brand name legislation has been enacted but
is somehow deficient. 108 In United States v. Dial, 0 9 decided by the Sev-
enth Circuit during its 1984-85 term, the court affirmed the criminal con-
105. See Baker & Lawrence, supra note 98, at 306.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
107. Chief Justice Burger described the mail fraud statute as "A stopgap device to deal on a
temporary basis with the new phenomenon [fraudulent practice], until particularized legislation can
be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil." United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The mail fraud statute was used to prosecute securities fraud prior to the
enactment of the Securities and Exchange Acts; loan sharks prior to enactment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-
96 (1982); fraud in the sale of undeveloped land prior to enactment of the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982); and other fraudulent practices. See 414 U.S. at 406;
Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Prostrustean Bed, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 48 n.5 (1980).
108. See supra note 107. The government may sue under the mail fraud statute in order to
obtain a more severe penalty than allowable under a statute enacted to deal with the particular
fraudulent practice, provided, of course, that the particularized legislation does not preempt the mail
fraud statute. See United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Labus v.
United States 446 U.S. 919 (1980). Additionally, the the government may sue under the mail fraud
statute when it feels that the language of the particularized legislation is ambiguous and thus convic-
tion under such legislation is less certain. See United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 116 (1985). Finally, the mail fraud statute is often joined with claims arising
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viction of a commodities futures trader until the mail and wire fraud 110
statutes. At the time the suit was initiated, an express cause of action for
the offense existed under the Commodities Futures Trading Act. 11  This
note will examine the appropriateness of permitting the government to
sue under the mail fraud statute in the case where specialized legislation
has already been enacted. Further, it will explore the dicta of the Dial
case indicating the Seventh Circuit's willingness to broadly construe the
mail and wire fraud statutes. And lastly, it will examine the implications
of the Dial dicta on securities and commodities laws.
Dial was an experienced silver futures trader and manager of a
branch office of the Clayton Brokerage Company (Clayton). Defendant
Salmon was Clayton's president. The International Monetary Corpora-
tion (IMC) was a large foreign investment group.
On the weekend of November 10, 1978, IMC issued Clayton a check
for $25 million in order to open a discretionary futures trading account.
On that same weekend, Dial solicited his regular customers in order to
create a large block order for February silver futures contracts. 112 There-
after, the defendants engaged in an elaborate scheme whereby they
purchased February silver futures contracts for their own account, then
drove the prices higher by placing the block order for the same on behalf
of their regular customers and then larger orders on behalf of IMC. At
some point during the same day, the defendants learned that the IMC
check would not clear. Approximately a week or so later, the defendants
sold the contracts, first selling those in their own account, then those of
their regular customers and lastly those of IMC. All of the defendants'
customers made a profit and the IMC account was liquidated at a profit.
In perpetrating their scheme, Dial and Salmon failed to protect
Clayton by making margin deposits in their personal trading accounts.
Because futures exchanges require brokerage firms to maintain deposits
with the exchange to cover trading losses, brokerage firms in turn require
under the Securities and Comodities Acts. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430 (2d ed.
1961).
109. 757 P.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). The language of the wire fraud statute is very similar to
that of the mail fraud statute and courts have generally interpreted the statutes as prohibiting the
same types of conduct. See H. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 146
(1981).
I11. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
112. The check given by IMC was not certified. Communications with the bank upon which the
check was drawn made it increasingly likely that the check would not clear. At some point during
the day, Dial and Salmon learned these facts. It was unclear whether they learned of the facts prior
to the completion of their scheme.
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similar deposits from customers.' 13 Absent such margin deposits, the
brokerage firm itself must absorb any losses on customer trades. In the
Dial scheme, Dial and Salmon deleted their trading accounts from Clay-
ton's computerized margin program thereby escaping Clayton's margin
requirements. Similarly, because IMC's check did not clear, IMC had no
margin deposited with Clayton. Dial and Salmon concealed these facts
from other Clayton agents.
The excessive trading in February silver futures contracts caught the
attention of the Board of Trade and the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission. After an investigation, the United States government
brought an action for mail and wire fraud against the defendants. The
defendants were found guilty by a jury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
their convictions.
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the convictions, concluded that the
defendants had defrauded their customers. The court reasoned that Dial,
as a fiduciary, implicitly represented to his customers that he would try
to get them the best possible price. By intending to place his order ahead
of his customers, and by failing to disclose that fact, Dial misled his cus-
tomers and personally profited from them. The court also found that the
defendants had defrauded Clayton. By trading their personal accounts
and the IMC account without margin, the defendants shifted the risk of
losses to Clayton. The defendants' failure to disclose the risk amounted
to fraud.
The government did not charge the defendants with violations of the
Commodities Futures Trading Act (CFTA). 1 4 Although the CFTA im-
poses criminal liability under sections 4(b) and 9(b)115 on commodities
dealers who defraud or attempt to defraud their customers, the Seventh
Circuit found that it was proper to permit the government to sue under
the mail and wire fraud statutes. First, the court determined that cover-
age under the CFTA was uncertain. And second, it found that the
CFTA does not supersede the mail and wire fraud statutes.
Although commentators have suggested that coverage under the
CFTA is uncertain because the Act is ambiguous as to who can be held
liable,116 courts do not appear to have found difficulty in finding that
113. See generally I P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.10 (1982).
114. The penalty for a single violation of the CFTA is more severe than that under the mail and
wire fraud statutes. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982) (not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for five
years under the CFTA); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (not more than $1000 or imprisonment for five
years under the mail fraud statute).
115. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(A), 13(b) (1982).
116. See 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6 (452)
(Supp. 1984).
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commodities dealers may be subject to liability under the CFrA.117
Thus, it is unlikely that there would be uncertainty as to whether Dial or
Salmon are covered under the Act. Nevertheless, it appears well settled
that the Act does not supersede the mail and wire fraud statutes.
11 8
Thus, there was no legal impediment to the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity under the mail and wire statutes in the Dial case.
However, the Dial case is a good illustration of why it may be un-
wise to permit parties to sue under the mail and wire fraud statues where
specialized legislation has been enacted. As it will be demonstrated be-
low, in Dial, the Seventh Circuit indicated a willingness to broadly con-
strue the statutes. If the Seventh Circuit interprets the statutes as
broadly as Dial indicates it will, then the proof requirements under the
mail and wire fraud statutes may become less stringent than under Rule
lOb-5 or other specialized legislation. Consequently, the statute may be
employed to plug loopholes in legislation which Congress did not intend
to be plugged.' t 9
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision in Dial was fairly straight-
forward, in dicta the Seventh Circuit indicated a willingness to broadly
interpret the mail and wire fraud statutes. First, in the Dial case, none of
the alleged victims actually suffered financial loss. Yet the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the injury requirement was satisfied. The court
found: (1) if the market had not been strong, then the price of silver
futures contracts would have collapsed; (2) if the defendants, in perpe-
trating their scheme, had placed their customers' orders before their
own, then their customers would have made more money; (3) the risk of
loss was shifted to Clayton and this was itself an injury; 20 (4) the prac-
117. See Herman v. T. & S. Commodities, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
118. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309-11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Labus v.
United States, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. Shareef, 634 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1980); Bishop v.
Commodity Exch., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Abrahams, 493 F.
Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). These courts recognized that Congress' intent in enacting the CFTA
was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Commodities Futures Trading Commission over the regula-
tion of the Commodities Acts. However, the Senate Committee made it clear that the CFTA did not
prevent states from enforcing their antifraud statutes. As a corollary, the courts have found that the
mail fraud statute is not preempted. See Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act:
Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (citing S. REP. No. 73, 94th Cong., ist Sess.
(1975)).
119. The court's willingness to interpret the mail and wire fraud statutes broadly also has impli-
cations with respect to liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982). The mail and wire fraud statutes contain two of the underly-
ing offenses which may give rise to RICO liability. See id. § 1961. A civil plaintiff may obtain treble
damages under RICO. Id. at § 1964(c). Thus, if the Seventh Circuit intends to interpret the mail
and wire fraud statutes broadly, then RICO may give rise to enormous recoveries in cases where the
Securities Acts would provide no recovery.
120. The court determined that the risk of injury satisfies the injury requirement. The court
analogized to an employee who takes money from his employer and replaces it before it is missed.
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tice undermined the confidence in the market and thereby threatened to
destroy the benefits which the market bestows on society.
12'
Injury has long been considered an essential element of fraud. 2 2
However, even prior to its decision in Dial, the Seventh Circuit had sub-
stantially eroded the injury requirement of the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes. 123  For example, the Seventh Circuit has found that the injury
requirement is satisfied where an employee has deprived his employer of
loyal and faithful service. 124 The Seventh Circuit's relaxed reading of the
injury requirement has been criticized by commentators. 125 Dial illus-
trates that the Seventh Circuit intends to continue treating the injury
requirement in a relaxed manner.
And second, the court suggested that the defendants not only de-
frauded their customers and Clayton, but they defrauded the participants
in the commodities futures market as well. 126 The court found it signifi-
cant that Dial and Salmon traded their personal and IMC accounts with-
out margin. The court concluded that Dial and Salmon, by trading
without margin, created a misleading signal to the market participants,
and thereby defrauded them.
2 7
The fact that the employer does not suffer financial loss is irrelevant; the employee is still guilty of
embezzlement. See United States v. Bailey, 734 F.2d 296, 303-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
327 (1984). However, unlike mail fraud, the elements of embezzlement do not include injury. Thus,
risk of injury may not be sufficient to establish injury under the mail fraud statutes. In Dial, the
court did not rely on the theory of "fiduciary fraud" which has been developed by other Seventh
Circuit cases. The fiduciary fraud theory contemplates that an employee owes a duty of loyalty and
honesty to his employer. The deprivation of faithful service is an injury within the ambit of the mail
fraud statute. See United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 421-23 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 912 (1976). The fidicuiary fraud theory has been criticized by commentators. See Moreno,
supra note 107.
121. See 757 F.2d at 165-66 (the court discusses the benefits that commodity futures trading
bestows on society).
122. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963). Some courts
have held that there is no requirement of actual injury, rather, a reasonable probability that some
injury would result is sufficient. See United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 722 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); LA BUY, MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 36 F.R.D. 457,
600-06 (1965); Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673, 679 (1978); H.
FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 144 (1981).
123. In United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976),
the Seventh Circuit found that intangible harm can satisfy the injury requirement under the mail
fraud statute, and therefore the deprivation of an employer's right to the honest and faithful services
of its employee was sufficient injury. See generally Moreno, supra note 107, at 65-70.
124. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414; see also supra note 123.
125. See Moreno, supra note 107, at 65-70.
126. 757 F.2d at 169.
127. The court reasoned that the defendants' purchases of February silver futures contracts indi-
cated to market participants that some investors were predicting that the market price for such
contracts would rise. However, the defendants purchased the contracts not because they predicted,
based upon market conditions, that the market price would rise, but because they knew that through
their scheme they would be able to manipulate the price. Thus, the defendants' trading misled
market participants. Id. at 169-70.
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The difficulty with finding fraud with respect to the market partici-
pants is the lack of any duty owed by the defendants to disclose the fact
that they were trading without margin or to refrain from doing so.
128
Even under Rule lOb-5, which has generally been considered a flexible
antifraud provision, courts have required some element of a duty owed
and a breach of that duty, or in any case, some element of deceit.
29
Thus, the Dial case illustrates that the mail and wire fraud statutes
still play a vital role in securities and commodities laws. Further, and
more importantly, even though the Seventh Circuit's affirmation of the
mail and wire fraud convictions in Dial is quite proper and not in the
least alarming, in dicta the court indicated that it intends to construe the
mail and wire fraud statutes broadly. The court's broad reading of the
statutes leaves open the possibility that the statutes may inadvertently be
utilized to plug loopholes in Rule lOb-5 and other specialized legislation.
It is questionable whether Congress intended the mail and wire fraud
statutes to be used in this manner.
CONCLUSION
During its 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit decided a variety of
securities cases. The decisions indicate that the court is not willing to
restrict protections afforded to investors. For example, the court refused
to find that an investor's failure to investigate was unreasonable under
Rule lOb-5 even though the investor was obligated by law to conduct
such an investigation. Additionally, the court found that instruments
qualifying as notes do not also have to qualify as investment contracts in
order to constitute securities.
The court also demonstrated a willingness to extend protections for
investors through means other than the Securities Acts. For instance,
the court found that a broker, who renders investment advice to his cli-
ent, is liable to the client under the Illinois law of negligent misrepresen-
tation when that broker fails to inform the client of the factors which
make a particular investment unsuitable for the client. Additionally, the
128. Arguably, the fact that brokerage firms are required to maintain certain margin levels with
the Commodities Exchanges, imposes some kind of a duty on commodities traders to disclose
whether they are trading without margin because other traders are entitled to rely on compliance
with margin requirements. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (in determining whether the
defendant was liable under Rule lOb-5, the Commission first found it necessary to determine
whether the defendant was under a duty to disclose the information); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 228-35 (1979) (following Cady, Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was
not liable under Rule lOb-5 for trading on inside information because the defendant was under no
duty to disclose the information).
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court indicated a willingness to interpret the mail and wire fraud statutes
loosely and thereby created a possibility that the statutes will provide a
remedy where the Securities Acts would not.
On the other hand, the decisions indicate an unwillingness to extend
the application of the Securities Acts beyond their intended proscrip-
tions. The court refused to vary the standards under FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b) for reopening judgments in securities cases. The court found that
Congress did not intend to alter the rules of civil procedure when it en-
acted the Securities Acts. Further, the court demonstrated that it contin-
ues to consider the commercial nature of an intrument to be essential to
the determination of whether the instrument constitutes a security.
Two of the Seventh Circuit's well-settled rules of law which it reaf-
firmed this term were subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court rejected the sale of business doctrine. Additionally, the
Court held that federal courts may not stay arbitration of any arbitrable
claims until after judicial resolution of nonarbitrable claims.
